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This paper consists of three parts. First, we briefly describe some key features of the labor market
in Denmark, some of which contribute to the Danish labor markets behaving quite differently from
those in many other European countries. The next two parts exploit detailed linked employer-employee
data. In the second part we document in some detail an important aspect of the functioning and flexibility
of the labor markets in Denmark: the high level of worker mobility. We show that mobility is about
as high, or even higher, as in the highly fluid U.S. labor market. Finally, we describe and examine
the wage structure between and within firms and changes therein since 1980, especially with an eye
on possible impacts of the trend towards a more decentralized wage determination. The shift towards
decentralized wage bargaining has coincided with deregulation and increased product market competition.
The evidence is, however, not consistent with stronger competition in product markets eroding firm-specific
rents. Hence, the prime suspect is the change in wage setting institutions.
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we give a brief description of some key 
features  of  the  labor  market  in  Denmark,  some  of  which  we  argue  contribute  to  the 
Danish  labor  markets  behaving  quite  differently  from  those  in  many  other  European 
countries. Second, we document in some detail an important aspect of the functioning 
and flexibility of the labor markets in Denmark: the high level of worker mobility.
1 Third, 
we  describe  and  examine  the  wage  structure  between  and  within  firms  and  changes 
therein since 1980, especially with an eye on possible impacts of the trend towards a 
more decentralized wage determination. 
1 The Institutional Setting 
Although the Danish labor market in many respects resembles other labor markets 
in Europe, and Scandinavia in particular, it has a number of distinguishing features of its 
own. Below we briefly discuss some of them. More precisely we look at ten features of 
labor markets in Denmark.
2 These are:  
(i)  The high female labor force participation rate, which is among the highest 
in the world,  
(ii)  The  retirement  age  which  used  to  be  relatively  high,  but  has  during 
relatively few years fallen substantially,  
(iii)  The replacement ratio of unemployment benefits for low-wage earners, 
which  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge  is  the  highest  in  the  world.  The 
replacement ratio is considerably lower for high wage earners, but due to 
the compressed wage structure, a non-negligible portion of the employees 
has a very high replacement ratio.  
                                                 
1 This is one of the cornerstones of the Danish “flexicurity” model for labor market policy which has 
attracted a lot of attention in recent years; see e.g., chapter 2 in European Commission (2006). 
2  Some  of  these  specific  features  make  the  labor  market  in  Denmark  in  some,  but  absolutely  not  all, 
respects look more like that in the United States than labor markets in other European countries.   4 
(iv)  The relatively widespread eligibility for unemployment benefit.  
(v)  Voluntary membership of unemployment insurance funds.  
(vi)  Wage  bargaining  that  used  to  be  highly  centralized,  but  has  gradually 
become more decentralized.  
(vii)  Trade union membership and the coverage of unions are both high by 
international standards.  
(viii)  Weak job protection for blue collar workers and only a modest protection 
for white collar workers.  
(ix)  Indirect wage costs are internationally very low in Denmark, whereas the 
rate of direct taxation of wage income is among the highest in the world.  
(x)  Compared to many other countries, agreements between employers and 
trade  unions  constitute  a  more  important  regulatory  mechanism  than 
legislation and government interventions. This is one of the key elements 
in “the Danish model”.  
Each  of  these  aspects  has  consequences  for  the  behavior  of  people,  firms  and  their 
employees, and for the functioning of the Danish labor market.  
Female Labor Force Participation 
The high female participation is a well-known characteristic feature of the Danish 
labor market. The growing female share of employment has been facilitated by a massive 
growth  in  child-care  facilities.  Child-care  is  to  a  large  extent  provided  by  the public 
sector; 6 out of 10 children in the age group 1-6 years are in publicly provided daycare. 
Daycare used to be highly subsidized but is now less so. Female participation started to 
grow in the 1970’s in close connection to the growth of the public sector and the creation 
of the welfare state. Many of the jobs held by women, particularly in the public sector, 
were originally part-time jobs. Today only about 8-9% of women in the age range 25 to 
55  work  part-time.  The  increase  in  female  labor  force  participation  has  occurred  in 
parallel with a shift from part-time to full-time work. In recent years part-time work is   5 
common among young women and older women and sectoral differences with respect to 
the part-time work are small.  
Pension Systems and Retirement 
Denmark  has  for  many  years  had  a  pension  system  that  provides  the  entire 
population (and not only the working population) with old age pension, for men as from 
the age of 67 and for women as from 65 (recently the old age retirement has gradually 
been lowered to 65 also for men). This is a pay as you go system, where benefits are 
regulated by the parliament and are paid out of current tax revenue. In 1979 an early 
retirement program was introduced. All members of the UI system could as from the age 
of 60 receive a benefit corresponding to the UI until the recipient is entitled to normal 
pension. In addition, a publicly provided disability pension is available for all age groups, 
where  eligibility  is  determined  on  health  grounds.  The  proportion  of  the  labor  force 
receiving  disability  pension  was  in  2000  about  10  per  cent.  As  a  consequence  of 
especially the early retirement program the average retirement age has been falling over 
time. Thus, in 2004, only a third of the age group 60-66 were in the labor force.  
The early retirement program has been particularly  important for older workers 
because employers are reluctant to hire unemployed workers in their late or mid-fifties 
because they expect that they will go on early retirement as they become eligible. Bingley 
and Lanot (2004) have shown that there is no firm effect with respect to the use of the 
program, indicating that employers are not systematically pushing elderly employees into 
early retirement. Rather it is other factors such as the work situation of the spouse that are 
important. 
Unemployment Benefits 
The  unemployment  benefit  system  is  still  partly  organized  according  to 
“Bismarckian principles”. Thus, workers can voluntarily choose to become members of 
more than 30 different occupational unemployment insurance funds. Membership and 
eligibility to unemployment benefits are both conditional on that the person has had a job 
for at least one year. The unemployment benefit is 90% of the previous wage but with a   6 
maximum  of  1800￿  per  month.  Consequently,  the  replacement  ratio  for  low-wage 
workers  is  90%,  but  is  lower  for  higher  income  earners.  Unemployment  benefits  are 
taxed, but a special tax rate of 8% on all earned income does not apply to unemployment 
benefits. Together, the high replacement ratio and the asymmetric tax treatment create an 
incentive problem for low-wage workers as they earn little by working compared to being 
unemployed.  It  has  been  shown  that  23%  of  all  employed  women  and  12%  of  all 
employed men actually earn 80￿ less per week by working relative to what would have 
received as unemployment benefit claimants; see Smith (1998).  
Unemployment benefits are obtained from the first day of unemployment and are 
paid for one year without any other obligations than seeking work. After one year of 
unemployment, the UI recipient has to take part in an active labor market policy program. 
A high replacement ratio coupled with the fact that there is almost no experience rating 
for  neither  employers  nor  workers  imply  that  there  are  many  short  spells  of 
unemployment. Even in years of low unemployment more than 20% of all wage earners 
have experienced at least one spell of unemployment. A high proportion of these spells 
are concentrated around Christmas/New Year and other vacations. As a result, for low 
pay workers total working hours are about 80% of the total normal hours (to be explained 
below). 
The UI system is financed by general tax revenue but operated by the private UI 
funds. The UI funds are formally unrelated to the trade unions, but membership of the UI 
system  is  typically  considered  as  part  of  a  package,  which  also  includes  union 
membership. As a consequence, about 80 per cent of the wage earners are members of 
the UI system and about 85 per cent are members of trade unions (Neumann et al., 1991). 
 
The Danish Model for Co-operation 
The overall labor market model in Denmark is often called “The Danish Model”. 
The  key  ingredient  in  the  Danish  model  is  that  the  trade  unions  and  the  employers 
federation (the social partners) make agreements on most regulatory issues, and the role 
of the government is to “pick up and pay the bill”. The social partners take responsibility 
for wage bargaining and wage setting. They also make agreements concerning normal   7 
working  hours,  and  set  rules  for  labor  protection  with  respect  to  overtime  and  work 
environment.
3  As  a  consequence  there  is  no  minimum  wage  legislation  in  Denmark. 
Nevertheless, the social partners have agreed that no member firm will pay less than 
89.50  DKK  per  hour  plus  15%  vacation  pay,  i.e.,  altogether  13.8￿.  Although  the 
employers’  organizations  do  not  have  full  coverage,  the  unions  are  very  keen  on 
identifying workplaces paying less. According to anecdotal evidence workers are being 
paid less in the unorganized parts of the retail sector, and in the hotels and restaurant 
industries.  
The role of the government in Denmark is to provide unemployment benefits and to 
retrain workers who have lost their jobs because their productivity in their current job is 
too  low.  The  government  also  provides  health  care  and  disability  pensions.  In  other 
words, the government provides the safety net. This is also the case with respect to those 
who are not covered by unemployment insurance. These workers are in general eligible 
to social assistance, which is of the same size as the UI-benefit. The main difference is 
that all payments are means-tested. 
  The Danish labor market model has many features in common with the Swedish 
model and because of the similarities they are sometimes grouped together under the hat 
of “the Nordic Labor Market Model”. The main idea is that whenever a firm cannot keep 
workers productive in their current job the government should take responsibility and 
retrain workers. After retraining the workers should now be more productive and can 
therefore be hired in a new firm and thereby increase overall productivity.  
There are, however, distinct differences between the Danish and Swedish models. 
One of these is that the Danish model does not prohibit lay-offs, where the Swedish is 
considerably more restrictive in this respect. The idea behind the Danish model is that 
firms should not be forced to maintain a large workforce if it is no longer profitable to do 
so. In such a situation it is better for society that firms can rehire workers where these 
workers’ labor is more productive. This increases overall flexibility and productivity. Of 
                                                 
3  When  the  current  Liberal/Conservative  government  has  made  several  propositions  regarding  work 
environment, which is fairly general, both employers’ and workers’ organizations have been critical of state 
intervention into the area.   8 
course, it also puts a burden on the workers and that is probably the main reason for the 
relatively high unemployment benefit in Denmark (at least for the low-wage earners). 
Another difference is that the Swedish model builds heavily on a tripartite cooperation 
between government, unions and employers. So, in Denmark the government provides 
income  security,  while  the  labor  market  organizations  deliver  flexibility.  Hence,  the 
system is called “flexicurity”. 
Working Hours 
In Denmark so-called “normal working hours” are determined as the outcome of 
the general wage bargaining between the trade unions and the employers federation. As 
elsewhere, the normal working times have been gradually shortened in Denmark, too. 
The  reduction  has  on  average  been  about  0.7%  per  year  (Andersen  et  al.,  2001).  Its 
sources have changed over time. In the late 1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s the 
reduction  was  in  weekly  hours,  followed  by  a  period  when  the  annual  vacation  was 
increased from 4 to 5 weeks. In the 1990’s the reduction was again implemented as a 
reduction  in  the  number  of  weekly  hours;  from  40  to  37  hours.  Recently,  a  gradual 
expansion of vacation weeks from 5 to 6 weeks has begun. 
Annual normal working hours in Denmark are among the lowest in the world. Only 
the Germans work less than the 1690 hours per year worked on average by the Danes. 
However, far from all work that much; especially the low-wage earners work less. The 
average hours for low-wage-earners are only about 1140 hours in Denmark, while it was 
about 1700 hours in the US in the same period. The main reason is no doubt that the 
Danish UI system is not only subsidizing search between two jobs but also temporary 
lay-offs. 
Wage Bargaining 
Collective bargaining in Denmark has a long history – in fact, the first general 
collective wage agreement was settled already as early as in 1889 – and for little less than 
a century this was the predominant mode of wage determination. In recent years Danish 
wage setting has undergone large changes, which are briefly described in the sequel.   9 
 Until  the  beginning  of  the  1980s,  wages  were  set  in  biannual  national  wage 
negotiations. A key feature of wage determination was an automatic wage indexation 
system, which linked hourly wages to the consumer price index net of indirect taxes and 
subsidies.  Twice  per  year,  hourly  wage  increases  were  triggered  by  each  three-point 
change in the net CPI.  Although the indexation was not complete, it accounted for a 
large share of wage increases. 
General  wage  negotiations  took  place  between  the  Danish  Federation  of  Trade 
Unions (LO) and the Danish Employers’ Federation (DA), typically every second year. 
LO and DA set the pattern for the entire manual workers’ labor market. Although only 
about 40 per cent of the private sector labor force was employed in firms where both the 
employees and the employer were organized, the great majority of employers, and hence 
also of all workplaces, applied the results of the general agreement. The negotiations and 
the general agreement were split into general and specific issues such as working hours, 
vacations and minimum wage tariffs.
4  For the vast majority of white-collar workers and 
public  sector  employees,  the  wage  setting  mechanism  is  quite  similar  regarding 
negotiations, timing, etc. to that for the blue-collar workers. The difference has been that 
these groups have never received as much in terms of wage drift between the general 
contracts as blue collar workers, but have been compensated for the wage drift in the 
form of larger wage increases in the central bargains. 
As from the beginning of the 1980s, there has been a tendency towards more and 
more  decentralization  of  wage  bargaining  and  wage  setting.  A  first  step  was  the 
abolishment  of  wag  indexation  in  1982.  From  1987  to  1993  negotiations  concerning 
wages were done at the industry level. From 1993 onwards the general wage negotiations 
have mainly focused on working hours, pensions, sickness pay and vacation. At the same 
time  wage  bargaining  proper  has  moved  down  to  the  industry  or  firm  levels  and  an 
increasing share of the wage agreements have  been made at the individual employee 
                                                 
4 As mentioned above, Denmark does not have a legally set minimum wage. However, the lowest tariff 
wage agreed upon in the wage negotiations sets a floor for the wages to be paid, and changes in the 
minimum wage tariff shifts the entire wage rate distribution.   10 
level. Already in 1993, 71 per cent of all agreements in the market for manual labor were 
of this type. 
While the wage setting has been decentralized in the private labor market, wage 
bargaining  in  the  public  sector  is  still  highly  centralized  with  biannual  national-level 
negotiations.  However,  a  new  wage  system  called  “Ny-løn”  (New-wage)  has 
considerably fewer wage tariffs than before and the intention is to move towards more 
individualized pay according to qualifications, job functions and individual performance 
also in the public sector. The performance pay element in public sector wages remains 
rather small, however. 
The Labor Market and the Macroeconomy 
Figure  1  describes  the  development  of  unemployment  and  annual  percentage 
changes in real GDP since 1980. As can be seen from the figure, the time series changes 
in unemployment are chiefly driven by changes in GDP. As from the mid-nineties there 
has been a long period of continuously decline in open unemployment, and so, at the end 
of  the  period,  Denmark  is  one  of  the  not  so  numerous  European  countries  that  have 
succeeded  in  lowering  its  unemployment  rate  to  levels  not  experienced  since  the 
seventies. 
It should be noted, however, that as active labor market policies have played an 
increasingly important role, and as participants in active labor market programs are not 
counted  as  unemployed,  open  unemployment  has  become  a  more  and  more  dubious 
measure of the state of the labor market. We have, therefore, in Figure 1 also included an 
adjusted unemployment rate which includes individuals in active labor market programs 
among the unemployed and consequently also in the labor force. The main difference is 
in the levels, while the peaks and throughs are the same. It is worth noting, that whereas 
the rate of unemployment during business cycle upturns is lower at the end of the period 
than in the mid-eighties, this is not true for the adjusted unemployment rate.   11 
Flexibility 
The institutional framework of the Danish labor market implies that there are few 
barriers to mobility between firms. For the employers, the costs of laying off workers are 
low because of the absence of severance pay legislation and experience rating in the 
unemployment insurance system as well as the weak job security of particularly blue-
collar  workers.  For  the  employees,  costs  of  changing  employer  or  experiencing 
unemployment spells are reduced by generous unemployment benefits, which are readily 
available to insured employees and by the fact that many social benefits, pensions and 
vacation are independent of the individual’s current employer and are hence transferable. 
As a consequence, the Danish labor market is characterized by both high job mobility and 
high wage mobility.  
2 Data Sources 
The main data source used in the empirical analyses below is the so-called IDA-
database kept by Statistics Denmark. The IDA is a longitudinal database that contains 
information about all individuals aged 15 to 74 (demographic characteristics, education, 
labor market experience, tenure and earnings) and employees in all plants in Denmark 
during  the  period  1980-2001.  This  information  has  been  collected  by  merging 
information  from  several  registers  in  Statistics  Denmark  with  the  help  of  unique 
identification numbers for individuals and plants. The persons and plants are matched at 
the  end  of  November  in  each  year.  Consequently,  only  changes  between  ends-of-
Novembers  are  accounted  for  (not  intermittent  changes).  Statistics  Denmark  has 
aggregated the plant-level information to the level of firms for the first time in the late 
nineties for the Pay and Performance project at Aarhus School of Business and continues 
to  do  so  for  the  Center  for  Corporate  Performance.  With  the  help  of  the  unique 
identification numbers of individuals and plants (firms) additional information from other 
registers as well as surveys to firms or individuals which have information about the 
same identification numbers. 
The background data for the IDA consists of various registers supplemented with 
data from the latest census in 1970. Thus, data on education come from the Census in   12 
1970 and from reports from all educational institutions on their current population of 
students and their completion. This means that the educational register contains status 
and all upgrades after the census.  
The wage information is constructed as follows. The point of departure is register 
data  containing  tax-based  information  on  the  total  earnings  paid  to  each  individual 
worker during the year. Earnings may consist of earnings from several employers. The 
data are considered to be of high quality because the tax authorities use them to assess 
each employee’s earnings. At the same time the wage records constitute deductible labor 
costs for the employers.  
The  number  of  working  hours  is  estimated  as  follows.  The  employers’ 
contributions to a comprehensive pension scheme are determined by the number of hours 
worked as a fraction of normal annual working hours. Thus, for hourly paid workers, i.e. 
all blue-collar workers, pension contributions were up to 1993 proportional to the number 
of  hours  worked.  For  monthly  paid  salaried  employees  the  supplementary  pension  is 
computed based on the normal length of the working day according to a three-step scale. 
The IDA makes use of information about the employers’ contributions to the pension 
schemes to compute the annual number of working hours for each individual. It should be 
noted that these are estimates. One problem is that the supplementary pay for overtime 
hours does not yield additional points for the pension schemes. Hence, overtime hours are 
not properly accounted for.  
Hourly wage rates are calculated by dividing the earnings at a particular employer 
with the estimated annual working hours at that employer. The estimated hourly wage 
rates  are  most  reliable  for  the  hourly  paid  workers.  However,  after  1993  pension 
contributions have gradually also been paid during sickness and unemployment spells. 
Consequently, as from the mid-nineties, the quality of the hourly wage information is 
likely to be of poorer quality. 
3 Worker Mobility  
This section looks into worker mobility in somewhat more detail. We start by 
considering the frequently used measures, entry and exit rates, calculated in the case of   13 
entry rates as the proportion of new employees in the firm in end-of-November year t as 
compared to end-of-November year t-1 and for exit rates the proportion of employees 
who have exited from the firm since end-of-November in year t-1.
5 Entry and exit rates to 
and from Danish private sector firms during 1981-2001 are shown in Figure 2. We can 
see that the entry and exit rates show no trend and fluctuate around 26 per cent. The 
variations in the entry rate are clearly larger than for exits.  The fluctuations appear to be 
pro-cyclical for both entry and exit rates. Thus, hires and separation both increase in 
upturns and decrease in downturns. On average about one third of all annual job exits are 
to non-employment states; see Frederiksen and Westergaard-Nielsen (2006).  
Looking  beyond  the  average  entry  and  exit  rates  reveals  that  they  differ 
considerably between different parts of firms’ wage distributions. Figure 3 shows the 
entry and exit rates in the top and bottom quartiles of the wage distribution in each firm. 
Not surprisingly, mobility is substantially higher in the lowest quartile.  In the lowest 
quartile entry rates exceed exit rates with a wide margin, whereas the relative magnitudes 
are reversed in the top quartile. Naturally, this reflects the fact that people tend to get 
hired at the bottom and leave from positions further up in the wage distribution. Mobility 
out  of  low  paid  work  is  in  general  high  although  it  should  be  noted  that  a  third  of 
transitions out of low-wage jobs is out of the labor force; see Bolvig (2004). The two 
other thirds are to higher paid employment within the same firm and to jobs in other 
firms, respectively. Notably, Bolvig also finds that firms with higher than average share 
of low-wage workers have a lower workforce turnover than other firms. The entry rates 
in the bottom quartile vary pro-cyclically and are quite volatile. Entry into the top quartile 
displays the same pattern but the variation is less pronounced. 
 
Table 1 paints a picture of the composition and development of job spells and 
their duration. The numbers refer to year 2000. We can see that in that year out of 1.6 
million employees, almost half million had separated from a job since the previous year. 
Nearly  one  third  of  all  employees  (a  little  over  half  a  million)  were  in  another  job 
                                                 
5 Since the comparisons are between end-of-Novembers, and thus neglect mobility between intermittent 
short-term jobs, the entry and exit rates are downward biased.   14 
(actually, at another employer) compared to last year. From the third column it can be 
seen that in a cross-section most people employed in Danish private sector firms – 63.2 
per cent – are in jobs that had lasted less than five years. Less than ten per cent are in jobs 
the duration of which exceeds 15 years. This does not, however, mean that merely about 
ten per cent of employees end up in jobs lasting 15 years or more.  
The high turnover rates do not necessarily imply that all employees in the firms 
leave with the same frequency and that, as a consequence of that, long-tenured jobs are 
thin on the ground. There are a number of reasons for why the cross-sectional picture is 
misleading; see Hall (1982). First, and trivially, in order to have been in a job lasting for 
15 years or longer, the employee has to have been in the labor force for at least 15 years. 
Second, an additional reason for why the “population at risk” is considerably less than the 
total workforce is that most of job changes occur in the beginning of workers’ labor 
market careers. Therefore, one should not expect to find many long-term employment 
relationships before the employees have turned forty. As can be seen from the three last 
columns in the table, the probability of staying in the same firm for one, five or ten 
additional years increases with tenure. Thus, for instance, the probability that a person 
with 10 years of tenure will remain with the same employer for five (ten) additional years 
is 51 (27) per cent. Taking these features into account leads, as has been shown by Hall 
(1982) for the US, to a completely different picture of the prevalence of long-term jobs: 
despite high worker turnover, long job spells can be still be common. Does the same 
apply also to the Danish labor market? 
Table 2 gives the proportion of five-year age groups with five years of current 
tenure who go on to reach tenure for 20 years or more. These are calculated using the so 
called contemporaneous retention method of Hall (1982). We have computed these shares 
for  two  years,  1990  and  2000,  respectively.  Moreover,  for  comparison  purposes  we 
include Hall’s estimates from U.S. in 1978. Three features of the table are worth noting. 
First, the proportions of individuals whose eventual tenure will exceed 20 years were 
higher in 1990 than ten years later and this was true for all age groups. Of course, this 
difference may simply reflect the fact 1990 was a business cycle downturn year whereas 
2000  was  an  upturn  year.  As  we  saw  earlier,  mobility  is  pro-cyclical.  Second, 
considerably  higher  proportions  of  the  employees  are  in  lifetime  jobs  than  what  is   15 
observed in cross-sections. Thus, the high annual turnover rates, hovering between 25 
and 30 per cent, are consistent with the observation that a considerable portion – between 
25 and 35 per cent of prime age workers – of the employees land jobs in which they stay 
for substantial parts of their working lives. Third, the shares for Denmark appear to be 
somewhat lower than those for U.S. One should be cautious here, as the age structures of 
the  US  and  Danish  labor  forces  differ  somewhat.  Still,  it  is  clearly  the  case  that  the 
proportion staying on longer is not larger, but rather smaller, in Denmark than in the U.S. 
This accords with our arguments above that the institutional setup of the Danish labor 
market strongly facilitates mobility. 
 
 
4 The Changing Wage Structure 
 
Next we briefly consider some changes in the wage structure, and in particular 
changes  in  the  dispersion  of  wages.  The  wage  concept  used  is  real  monthly  wages 
(expressed in 1990 prices), calculated by multiplying each individual’s hourly wage rate 
by the number of a full-time employee’s monthly working hours. The population studied 
is, unless otherwise is stated, the private sector firms with minimum 20 employees. In 
order to reduce measurement errors in the monthly wages employees who have been in 
their current jobs for less than one year are omitted.  
 
  Figures 4a and 4b document changes in the distribution of individuals’ wages. 
We may note a clear, albeit not strong, increase in wage dispersion during the twenty 
years period. The increase has been about the same magnitude during both the eighties 
and the nineties. The period when wage differentials widened the most is 1987-94, that is 
the first period of a shift towards decentralized wage bargaining. In fact, the changes 
during  the  second  half  of  the  nineties  are  relatively  small,  especially  in  view  of  the 
changes in both wage setting and the increased adoption of new pay practices in firms 
(Eriksson, 2003b). There has been an increase on both sides of the median, but during the 
nineties wage dispersion below the median has been flat, whereas above median there is a   16 
noteworthy jump in the mid-nineties leading to a stronger increase during that decade; 
see Figure 4b. 
 
Changes in the dispersion of firm wages have followed a slightly different pattern: 
from being virtually flat in the eighties, the distribution of firm wages has widened during 
the second half of the period; see Figure 5. 
 
Turning next to a decomposition of the wage dispersion into within and between 
firm components, we restrict the sample to firms with 50 or more employees in order to 
make the within-firm dispersion concept meaningful. Two points emerge from Figure 6. 
There has been a trend-wise increase in between firm variance in wages whereas wage 
dispersion within firms fell during the eighties up to 1990 from which on it has been 
increasing  in  tandem  with  that  of  between-firm  wages.  By  2000,  within  firm  wage 
dispersion has not reached the level of the early eighties. Thus, the observed increase in 








As was discussed above, Denmark has during the two recent decades experienced 
a  shift  in  wage  bargaining  from  a  highly  centralized  system  to  a  considerably  more 
decentralized wage setting. The end of the era of centralized wage bargaining came in 
two steps: the first in 1987 when bargaining moved down to the level of industries, and 
the second and more important one, involving a larger share of wage setting actually 
being done at the level of firms, in years 1994-95. It seems plausible to assume that as a 
consequence of the decentralization of the wage bargaining and wage setting processes, 
                                                 
6 This section draws heavily on Eriksson (2003a).   17 
the relative weights of employer and employee effects for the resulting wage structure 
may have changed. The aim of this section is to describe and analyse these changes. 
A  shift  to  more  decentralised  wage  setting  is,  however,  not  the  only  possible 
cause  of  changes  in  firms’  internal  wage  structure.  The  much  discussed  skill-biased 
technological change suggests that not only do returns to observable skills increase, but 
the returns to unobservable skills as picked up by the firm effects in a standard cross-
sectional  earnings  equation  may  increase  as  well  (Katz  and  Autor,  1999).  Thus, 
inequality  among  employers  should  rise  in  tandem  with  rising  returns  to  observable 
skills. Another source of changes in firms’ wage structures is changes in firms’ local 
monopoly  power.  Deregulation  of  several  markets  and  increasing  international 
competition due to the implementation of the European Single Market Program in 1988-
92 and steadily falling transportation and information transmission costs can have eroded 
firms’ product market rents. When this is the case, we would expect inequality among 
employers to have declined over time.
7 
 
How could decentralization contribute to changes? One way of thinking about it is 
that under centralized wage setting, firm-specific bargaining is constrained and hence, 
local bargaining power is in general low and varies little across firms. With weakening 
centralized wage-setting institutions, local bargaining power rises and consequently, we 
would  expect  to  see  an  increase  in  the  variability  of  the  firm-specific  component  of 
wages. 
 
Next we examine changes in wage setting in Danish firms from the perspective of 
eventual changes in their internal labour markets. For this reason the analysis is restricted 
to a sub-sample from the IDA database consisting of larger private sector firms. More 
precisely, the sample we henceforth examine consists of 222 firms that have been above 
the size of 200 employees in each year during the period 1980-2000.
8 The number of 
observations on individuals varied between 417,267 in 1995 and 457,821 in 1990. 
                                                 
7 The prediction concerning the impact of increased competition on within-firm inequality is ambiguous; 
see e.g., Cuñat and Guadalupe (2006). 
8 About half of the firms have less than 500 employees and about the same proportion of the firms are from   18 
 
Wage equations with hourly wage rates as the dependent variable and using the 
observable individual characteristics age, education, gender and tenure plus employer-
specific intercepts as explanatory variables are estimated. The estimations are carried out 
for five different cross-sections: years 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. In the sequel we 
briefly present and discuss some of the results obtained. 
 
It should be emphasized that not only does the population of firms differ from the 
one examined in the previous section, also the wage concept, the hourly wage rate, is a 
different one. This explains why we from Table 3 observe a somewhat different picture 
of changes in the wage structure: wage dispersion first decreased during the eighties and 
then increased during the nineties. In 2000, between-persons wage inequality was still 
smaller than 20 years ago, but had almost returned to its 1985 level. As we will come 
back  to  later,  during  the  same  period  between-firm  wage  inequality  has  grown 
considerably. 
 
From Table 4, where the estimates of the returns to the skill variables and gender 
are collected, we can first of all observe that including the firm fixed effects into the 
estimating  equations  does  very  little  to  change  the  estimates  to  the  human  capital 
variables. On the other hand, we can see that some of the estimated returns to skill have 
changed  over  time.  Thus,  during  the  eighties,  the  age-earnings  profiles  became 
successively  steeper  but  have  not  changed  much  since.  Returns  to  tenure  have  also 
increased, although it should be noticed that their magnitude is relative small: less than 
one per cent per year.  
                                                                                                                                                 
the manufacturing sector, whereas the remaining 20 and 30 per cent are in the trade and services sectors, 
respectively. The firms differ quite a lot with respect to employment growth; a little over 40 per cent has 
experienced a decline in employment during the two decades. The workforces in the sample firms consist 
to 60 per cent of males (differing from the whole Danish labour force where the gender shares are equal – 
the difference is due to the fact that the firms are from the private sector) and their skill structures have 
undergone considerable changes during period; with a notable decline in the share of unskilled blue-collar 
workers. At the same the age structure has remained remarkably stable.   19 
 
The  largest  changes  have  occurred  with  respect  to  returns  to  schooling.  The 
estimated  return  to  one  additional  year  of  schooling  has  almost  doubled  during  the 
twenty-year period. The return started to grow from a very low level indeed and has at 
the end of the period reached about the same magnitude as one additional year of labour 
market experience. All in all, the estimates indicate that there has been an increase in the 
returns  to  observable  skills  according  to  several  dimensions  during  the  period  under 
study. 
 
For the gender differential estimates it makes a difference whether the firm effects 
are included or not, as entering them leads to a drop in the differential by about one third. 
During the two decades, there was first a decrease in the male-female wage differential 
but this decline seems to have levelled off during the nineties. This corroborates what has 
been found in the gender gap studies. Most of that literature does not, however, account 
for the demand side.
9 The results in Table 4 demonstrate that this can be misleading. 
Moreover, there is an interesting pattern insofar that the gender gap reduction is much 
larger when firm fixed effects are controlled for.  
 
Table 5 displays the adjusted R
2 statistics from estimations with the firm effects 
only and with firm fixed effects and human capital, respectively. We may observe first, 
that on their own the firm fixed effects explain an increasing portion of differences in 
individual  wage  differentials.  Second,  the  “full”  model’s  explanatory  power  has  also 
increased over time. 
 
The dispersion of “raw” firm fixed effects has increased; in fact, it has more than 
doubled;  see  Table  6.  The  increase  has  been  especially  pronounced  in  the  nineties. 
Together  with  increases  in  returns  to  observable  individual  characteristics  this  is 
consistent with firm fixed effects picking up sorting according to unobservable skills.
10    
                                                 
9 Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2005) is an exception using Danish data. 
10 Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) have found a similar pattern for US manufacturing during the sixties, 
seventies and eighties.   20 
 
Although part of the increase goes away when observables are controlled for, a 
considerable portion remains. Thus, changes in observable skills are not able to explain 
the  whole  observed  increase  in  between-firm  inequality.  The  observed  pattern  is, 
however, also consistent with an increasing dispersion of bargaining power as a result of 
weakening of centralized bargaining institutions. In contrast to the changes mentioned 
above, the dispersion of the residuals of the wage equations displays no trend, but varies 
around a stable mean. The fact that the dispersion of fixed effects has not decreased, but 
rather  increased,  indicates  that  increasing  competition  has  not  lead  to  the  predicted 
decline in between employer inequality. 
 
Let us now consider what has happened to the persistence of firm effects over 
time.  Table  7a  answers  that  question  by  measuring  the  “persistence”  by  means  of 
autocorrelations: corr (FE(f,t), FE(f,t-T)) for different time gaps T (5, 10 and 15 years, 
respectively).
11 The fixed effects are taken from the wage regressions that include human 
capital  controls.
12  The  key  message  from  the  table  is  that  there  have  been  no  major 
changes in the persistence in firm fixed effects over time. There is a slight decline in the 
five-year correlations, but this provides only limited evidence of a weakening importance 
of internal labour markets. The persistence is fairly strong and does not decay rapidly as 
the time gap is widened. The same exercise was also carried out for rank correlations; see 
Table 7b. The pattern with respect to changes over time is the same, except that the decay 
associated  with  lengthening  the  time  differences  becomes  stronger.  At  any  rate,  the 
results of both tables indicate that firms that pay above (below) the average also are very 
likely to continue doing that five or ten years later. 
 
Eriksson (2003a) also estimated the wage equations separately for each firm and 
year and retained the coefficient estimates from each regression and used them as data. 
The first thing looked at is the changes in their between-firm spread over time. The mean 
                                                 
11 FE denotes the firm fixed effects. 
12 Excluding controls leads to somewhat higher correlations, but the pattern observed in Table 7a remains 
intact.   21 
across  firms  estimates  of  the  return  to  schooling,  say,  differs  somewhat  from  those 
reported  in  Table  4,  which  were  based  on  estimating  the  equation  on  all  firms.  The 
dispersion of the coefficients for age, schooling, tenure and gender is set out in Table 8. 
From this it can be seen that not only has the mean returns to schooling increased, but its 
dispersion  has  too.  The  development  of  the  age  coefficients  is  different;  they  first 
increase and then decline. The gender wage gap coefficient, which on average has first 
declined and then has stayed flat displays an increasing dispersion across firms over time. 
Hence, overall there appears to have been a tendency towards an increase in the spread, 
not  only  in  firm  fixed  effects,  but  also  in  how  firms  reward  different  observable 
individual traits of their employees. 
 
A second thing the estimated firm-wise coefficients are used for is to look at their 
persistence, again by means of computed autocorrelations. The five-year autocorrelations 
for age, schooling, tenure and gender are collected in Table 9. Strong internal labour 
markets would imply highly persistent firm-specific returns. This is also what is found, 
although the correlations are somewhat lower than for firm fixed effects. Moreover, for 
schooling and gender a decline in the persistence can be observed. Consequently, there is 
some indication of internal structures have become more flexible. The changes do not 
appear to be large, however. 
 
Summarizing the analysis of the larger firms it was found that there has been a 
clear increase in between-firm wage inequality. This is not consistent with the notion that 
increased  competition  in  the  product  markets  erodes  firm-specific  rents.  Between-
employee wage inequality first decreased but increased during the nineties, and at the 
same  time  returns  to  human  capital,  in  particular  schooling,  have  increased.  The 
dispersion in firm-specific fixed effects has increased over time, which is consistent with 
both skill-biased technological change and weakened centralized wage bargaining. The 
employer effects are relatively persistent and there are no traces of significant changes in 
this.  The  same  holds  for  returns  to  human  capital  at  the  level  of  the  firm.  Both  the 
observable  and  the  time-invariant  unobservable  worker  and  employer  characteristics, 
respectively, have become more important in explaining wage inequality.   22 
 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
 
The  key  messages  of  this  chapter  are  two.  First,  the  institutional setup of  the 
Danish labor market differs not only from that found in most other European countries 
but also from that in the neighboring Nordic countries. A main difference is the absence 
of barriers to mobility. In a sense this is only natural as for almost a century Danish wage 
setting was highly centralized and characterized by a very compressed wage structure 
which left only limited scope for employers to adjust to changing labor market conditions 
through wage  adjustment. Worker mobility is indeed high. We show that mobility is 
about as high, or even  higher,  as in the highly fluid U.S. labor market. But we also 
document that although labor turnover rates are high, a considerable portion of workers 
are in long-term employment relationships. 
 
Second,  the  ongoing  process  towards  increasingly  decentralized  wage  setting, 
which began in the second half of the eighties, has given rise to an increase, albeit of 
relatively modest magnitude, in the dispersion of wages. The widening wage distribution 
seems  to  be  predominantly  due  to  increased  wage  differentials  between  firms,  and 
considerably less due to growing within firm wage dispersion. In parallel, the level and 
between-firm  variance  in  returns  to  human  capital  have  increased.  The  shift  towards 
decentralized  wage  bargaining  has  coincided  with  deregulation  and  increased  product 
market competition. The evidence appears not to be consistent with stronger competition 
in product markets eroding firm-specific rents. Hence, the prime suspect is the change in 
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Table 1. Distribution of tenure and contemporaneous retention rates in 2000 
Tenure 
(in years) 
Movers  Stayers  Prob. stay- 
ing one add. 
year 
Prob. stay- 
ing 5 more  
years  
Prob. stay- 
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Table 2. Proportions reaching 20+ years of tenure* 





























* The numbers show the proportion of those in each age group with 5 years of tenure 






Table 3. Between-persons wage inequality 
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Table 4. Returns to skill estimates* 
 
Year  Age  Age sq/100  Years of 
schooling 






























































*. Standard errors are omitted because they are all so small. The numbers in parentheses 





Table 5. Adjusted R
2s 
 
  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Firm fixed effects only  0.190  0.179  0.226  0.267  0.283 


















Table 6. Dispersion (standard deviation) of firm fixed effects 
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Table 8. Dispersion (standard deviation) of regression coefficients across firms 
 
Year  sd(￿age)  sd(￿schooling)  sd(￿tenure)  sd(￿gender) 
1980  0.012  0.012  0.017  0.110 
1985  0.030  0.017  0.012  0.113 
1990  0.020  0.028  0.007  0.139 
1995  0.013  0.031  0.013  0.164 






Table 9. The persistence of ￿s over time; 5-year autocorrelations 
 
Year     Age            Schooling  Tenure  Gender 
1985  0.579  0.721  0.697  0.836 
1990  0.731  0.670  0.655  0.730 
1995  0.777  0.692  0.671  0.737 
2000  0.724  0.656  0.649  0.685 
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Change in GDP (%) Adjusted unemployment rate
Unadjusted unemployment rate
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Exit rate Entry rate
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Exit rate, top quartile Entry rate, top quartile
Entry rate, bottom quartile Exit rate, bottom quartile
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Figure 6. Variation in wages within and between firms, 1980 -2000. 
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